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PHD THESIS SUMMARY: Deliberative Representation in Formal Philosophy

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This thesis explores the legitimacy of political representation in deliberative democracies. More specifically, I investigate (i) how a system of proportional representation should be designed in a deliberative democracy, and (ii) what conditions should be met for deliberations among representatives to be democratically legitimate. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 deal with the first sub-question: how a system of proportional representation should be designed in a deliberative democracy. Chapter 5 addresses the second sub-question: what conditions should be met for deliberations among representatives to be democratically legitimate.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 deal with the question of how a system of proportional representation should be designed in a deliberative democracy. Chapter 2 takes a critical look at the Chamberlin-Courant (1983) system of proportional representation. This system aims to achieve fairness to individual voters by ensuring that the deliberations and decisions of the committee are as close as possible to deliberations and decisions in the ideal direct democracy where all are able to participate. This is an *individual-based* justification for proportional representation, which is often neglected in favor of *group-based* justifications that are based on fairness to groups of voters and parties. I argue that the Chamberlin-Courant system does not in fact guarantee fairness to the individual voter because it does not take sufficient account of the fact that the satisfactoriness of a representative for an individual may vary per issue. For instance, Anna may represent me best on environmental issues, but Betta may represent me best on economic issues. I then propose an alternative—the multidimensional system—that takes this into account. In contrast to recent literature in social choice theory, which focuses primarily on questions about the computational complexity of these rules (for example, Jain and Talmon 2020), I am concerned with the question of whether these rules satisfy normative democratic conditions. I also emphasize that a system of proportional representation is more than a committee selection

problem: in addition to selecting a committee, the voting weight of each member should also be determined. More specifically, the voting power of each committee member should be proportional to the number of individuals in the population they decisively represent. Finally, I connect formal political theory with a practical use case: the use of voting guides in the Netherlands. I do this to further motivate the proposed system and show that it is desirable and feasible to implement in modern democracies.

The next two chapters delve deeper into the representation axiom that serves as the normative underpinning of the Chamberlin-Courant committee selection rule. This axiom specifies how committees should be ranked for an individual based on her ranking over the candidates. More specifically, it says that a committee A is more representative of an individual i than another committee B if and only if the highest-ranking member of A is ranked higher than the highest-ranking member of B. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on two problems with this axiom.

Chapter 3 offers another way of dealing with the multidimensionality of preferences addressed in chapter 2. I raise the *problem of plural identities*: it is commonly assumed that each individual holds a single, all-things-considered ranking on the set of candidates and that any conflicts between her multiple cares and concerns have been resolved. These multiple cares and concerns are reflected in the plurality of identities an individual possesses, each of which has its own underlying set of values, views, and interests. For instance, an individual can be a woman, an environmentalist, and a person of color—and each of these identities can have different rankings on the set of candidates. It has been shown that these different rankings cannot be aggregated into an all-identities-considered one unless there is a single identity part that completely determines this ranking (Binder 2014). How then can we rank different committees that can be formed out of the set of candidates based on how representative they are of individuals, given the various identities that they hold? To answer this, I characterize a committee ranking procedure which compares committees based on the value that they have in terms of making each identity part of the individual present in its deliberations and decisions. This committee ranking procedure is a variant of simple majority judgment applied to an individual's plural identities ranking different sets of candidates. Given the well-established result that ranking procedures based on majority judgment can be cyclic, I offer an escape route

by restricting the domain of the identity profiles, and discuss the extent to which this can be justified on the basis of identity coherence.

In chapter 4, I note that voters do not only have preferences *for* given parties or candidates, but also preferences *against* them. Individuals' negative political preferences have not been satisfactorily taken into account in the social choice theoretic literature on committee ranking and selection. I draw on the signed orders framework of Fishburn (1992) to represent individuals' preferences for candidates' inclusion in and exclusion from the committee. I then propose a specific method of extending these signed orders to a ranking on the set of committees using a signed version of the Borda-sum ranking from Darmann and Klamler (2019). To do this, I first characterize a more general version of the Borda-sum ranking which allows for indifferences between distinct candidates, and then use this as a starting point to characterize the signed version of the Borda-sum ranking.

Chapter 5 addresses the question of what conditions should be met for deliberations among representatives to be democratically legitimate. Chapter 5 draws attention to a tension present in representative deliberation: representatives are expected to (i) stay true to the values that they share with their constituents, while also being expected to (ii) exercise independent judgment to be able to make deliberation productive. What deliberative conditions should then be in place for representatives to be able to do both? Using a model of representative deliberation procedures, I formalize (i) by defining value-constrained representative deliberation procedures where representatives come out of deliberations holding the same set of value judgments that they held coming into deliberations. I then show that the agenda should have a minimal level of complexity in order for a representative deliberation procedure to also satisfy (ii). The dissertation concludes with a discussion of the implications for the design of representative deliberation procedures.

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