Equality of resources, risk, and the ideal market

Authors

  • Lars Lindblom Umeå University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v8i1.181

Keywords:

the market, risk, Dworkin, distributive justice, hypothetical insurance, equality of resources, luck egalitarianism

Abstract

Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality of resources makes extensive use of markets. I show that all these markets rely on one specific neoclassical conception of the ideal market in full equilibrium, as analyzed by Debreu. This market must be understood as operating under circumstances of certainty, and this is incompatible with several components of Dworkin's account. In particular, it does not allow one to hold people responsible for their option luck, and it implies a high social safety net rather than insurance schemes for addressing brute luck. I conclude by outlining an interpretation of equality of resources that takes the ideal market seriously.

Author Biography

Lars Lindblom, Umeå University

Lars Lindblom is a senior lecturer at Umeå University. He works on issues in the intersection between political philosophy and economics. He has written on topics such as invisible hand explanations in Nozick’s political philosophy, incomplete contract theory and consent in business ethics, and responsibility-catering prioritarianism and risk management.

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Published

2015-07-03

How to Cite

Lindblom, L. (2015). Equality of resources, risk, and the ideal market. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 8(1), 1-23. https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v8i1.181

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Section

Articles