Can We Design Spontaneity? Hayek, Design, and the Normative Appeal of Spontaneous Orders
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.23941/ejpe.v17i1.736Abstract
Spontaneous orders are an essential concept in political theory and political economy. Such orders entail the impossibility of predicting outcomes in detail and hence controlling and directing social processes. Many phenomena characterizing contemporary societies can be depicted as spontaneous orders, from the housing and financial markets to the evolution of norms and trends. Yet, it is well known that not every spontaneous order is beneficial. Therefore, what form of political framework is compatible with recognizing such orders? In this article, I address this problem through the example of the work of Friedrich Hayek, a prominent liberal theorist of spontaneous orders. His work shows the necessity to theorize a government of spontaneous orders based on maximizing reasonable expectations and individual freedom. I finally emphasize what such a theory implies for political power, which is not abolished but should handle complexity appropriately.
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Copyright (c) 2024 Nathanaël Colin-Jaeger
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.